Pathogens Research & Biological Weapons

The 1975 summit focused primarily on biological safety. Biosecurity–preventing the intentional misuse of biotechnology to cause harm–was not on the agenda. Why? The Biological Weapons Convention would enter into force just one month later, in March 1975. The USA had halted its biological weapons program by 1970. Bioweapons seemed to some a solved problem, more or less, and to others a topic that they themselves – as scientists – could not address alone.

Times have changed. The revealing of a Soviet bioweapons program, bioterror attacks by sub-state actors, and the ongoing proliferation of increasingly powerful biotechnology tools have renewed and are amplifying concerns that biotechnology will be used to cause harm. Nations – including China, USA, and Russia – have recently lobbied public accusations of adversarial bioweapons programs. Continuing ambiguity regarding the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has eroded trust at multiple levels. Use of chemical weapons risks weakening moral norms preventing use of biological weapons. Naturally circulating, diverse and diversifying mpox, influenza, and other pathogens would make accurate detection and response to any biological attack more challenging.        

Initial Discussion Topics 

The Latin phrase "hostis humani generis" (enemy of all mankind) was invoked in 1970 to argue against biological weapons. What can and should we say to renew and strengthen such cultural norms or ways of being going forward?

What policies, frameworks, structures, or global coordination mechanisms could be renewed or adopted that would eliminate unnecessarily risky research, reduce the likelihood of an accidental pandemic, and make it easier to determine the origin of any next pandemic? For example, how might lessons from governing research with smallpox apply to other pathogens?

Can extra-governmental frameworks help secure biology, such as third-party research audits? How can global publics play a more meaningful role in decisions about life sciences research and associated technologies? What role(s) should cross-border professional associations or alliances play? Other?

Does biosecurity need to be perfect? Is a world free of pandemics possible? Practical?

Potential Outcomes

A re-denunciation of biological weapons programs and the deliberate use of biology to cause harm more broadly.

A call to govern research with pandemic-potential pathogens through the use of “red-lines,” “guardrails,” “speed bumps,” “streetlights,” and “driver registration,” or by more aggressively limiting work to specific, bounded, and well-defined needs.  

Identifying pathways to enable independent “research audits” or independent monitoring of institutions and individuals performing work with pathogens of pandemic potential.

Artificial Intelligence & Biotechnology

Biosafety and biosecurity depend on knowing what is dangerous. Traditionally such knowledge has been gained by direct experience; what has caused harm in the past? Lists of dangerous toxins or pathogens get organized, updated, and are used to help limit access and reduce risks.

Today, models trained on natural DNA sequences can generate new sequences encoding potentially novel biological functions. An increasing fraction of DNA sequences ordered for synthesis have never been seen before. For such sequences we may not know from direct prior experience what potential risks, if any, they encode.

Separately, models trained on the scientific literature can guide novices in pursuing sophisticated biological work. Uncertainty about imagined or theoretical risks combined with jockeying for power in the arena of artificial intelligence have created extraordinary claims and sometimes arbitrary government responses. Powerful non-experts pontificate that ChatGPT will soon enable anyone anywhere to make a “killer chickenpox.” Government directives have attempted to set computational limits on training biotechnology LLMs; limits that at least some seemingly ignore.

More clearly, artificial intelligence has already proven itself to be a boon enabling many positive biotechnology outcomes; the Nobel Prize committee agrees. Less clear is who will develop, own, and control the next generation of biotech AI models and tools.

Initial Discussion Topics 

What scientific and engineering questions or ambiguities define the uncertainty about how AI and biotechnology will be used together? For example, is it easier to use an AI tool to create a novel toxin or to recognize a synthetic toxin that has never been seen before; how do we know?

What research or practices would help de-escalate hyperbolic expectations, both positive and negative? What would help those developing computational tools realize their full potential for promoting human prosperity?

Should, and if so how should, the sourcing of data used to train models inform or structure the terms of use of the resulting computational tools? For example, how should publicly-funded sequencing efforts or Indigenous interests shape approaches to digital data and their use in training AI models?  

Are there special aspects or concerns that arise when commercial AI resources outpace academic or even governmental ones?

Potential Outcomes

A prioritized list of scientific or engineering questions arising at the intersection of AI and biotechnology most relevant to governance, broadly defined, and a call for research to answer such questions.

Identifying best options for governance of the uses of AI in biotechnology, whether via national academies, professional associations, extra-governmental organizations, legislation, governmental actions, or other means.

A proposal for how data or the sourcing of data used to train AI models should be governed in support of broader societal goals (e.g., equity, access, justice, other), along with potential pathways or plans for implementation.

Synthetic Cells 

The construction of life from scratch has long been heralded and is local history. From Jacques Loeb’s 1899 experiments with sea urchins in Pacific Grove, to Arthur Kornberg’s 1967 re-synthesis of phage DNA at Stanford, to Craig Venter et al.’s 2010 synthesis of a bacterial genome first in Rockville and later La Jolla. Cells are well recognized as the fundamental units of life. Yet there is no natural cell for which all of its life essential functions are understood. As such biotechnology workflows remain “Edisonian” (i.e., tinker-and-test) at the cellular scale. 

There are two main approaches for building synthetic cells: top-down and bottom-up. Top-down work remakes genomes from scratch, encoding only those genes whose functions are necessary for life. Bottom-up work seeks to construct cells from scratch starting only from purified molecules of known function. Some non-reproducing synthetic “cells” are already finding use (e.g., liposomal drug delivery platforms).

Whether by remaking or assembling, the routinization of cellular-scale bioengineering is expected to have many impacts. Various national and international efforts to build cells are being organized. Recent investigations of potential human and environmental risks from a certain type of synthetic cell built using biomolecules with reversed chirality — “mirror bacteria” — have resulted in calls to halt such work, for further discussion to evaluate the potential for unprecedented risks, and to determine if such risks can be addressed.

Not all scientists agree that “mirror life” would result in unprecedented risks. When conjectural risks of potential hazards meet calls for precaution in the face of the unknown, navigating paths forward requires both technical expertise along with other forms of insight and engagement.

Initial Discussion Topics

Is mirror life a potential hazard? What uncertainties are there and how could they be resolved? What happens next?

Work to construct regular life from scratch is expected to have many benefits but would make constructing mirror life easier. If mirror life leads to serious risks then how can work to construct regular life proceed responsibly?

What will be the most important potential hazards and opportunities involving synthetic cell research in 2030, 2040, and 2050? 

What are the priorities, mechanisms, and actions for governance of synthetic cells, in general, and mirror life, in particular? Who needs to be involved in such discussions? How do we ensure that any benefits are equitably distributed?

What aspects and matters “beyond the bench” arise today due to efforts to construct life from scratch (i.e., life from non-life), if any? What mechanisms can help monitor and disseminate “critical awareness,” and coordinate the translation of such awareness into actionable responses?

Potential Outcomes

A renewed call to not construct mirror life or a consensus proposal for how such work could proceed responsibly. A prioritized list of open questions guiding future discussions regarding mirror life and who should be involved in answering them.

Prioritized challenges and opportunities for governing the constructing of mirror life, globally, including purposeful misuse, perhaps resulting in an editorial on synthetic cells and biosecurity.

Potential pathways, if and as might be needed, for coordinating or governing work with synthetic cells, more broadly, perhaps resulting in a draft international agreement for coordinating the initial construction of synthetic cells from scratch. 

Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment 

Asilomar 1975 envisioned eventual deployment of engineered organisms into our world for reasons including agricultural productivity and environmental remediation. However, participants felt the need to first establish physical and biological containment mechanisms for safeguarding against potential hazards of the then-new recombinant DNA techniques. The emergence of the biological safety level (BSL) system for laboratory design plus efforts to create “enfeebled” host organisms were among the solutions devised to allow for recombinant DNA research to proceed while addressing many immediate concerns. 

The subsequent industrialization of biotechnology via recombinant organisms is impacting production of foods, medicines, and materials. Bioengineered crops now comprise the majority of what is planted in some nations while being banned in others. Direct-to-consumer bioengineered organisms, from bacteria to plants, are increasingly available and on occasion bring joy. Conservation biology and biodiversity loss are further motivating the potential development and use of biotechnologies more broadly. Taken together, researchers are developing many more potential biotechnology systems that would result in further use of bioengineered organisms on, within, and around us. How to consider, prevent, or manage the impacts of such uses of biotechnology on humans and ecological communities remains a contested domain.

Initial Discussion Topics 

What insights or lessons from the last half-century of GMO debates can best inform emerging prospects? 

Are we risking a naive re-entrenchment of utilitarian “inevitability” narratives? How can other traditions, practices, and beliefs best be engaged and respected?

What frameworks(s) are best suited for governing use of biotechnologies beyond conventional containment and who should be in charge? Should governance only be on a case-by-case basis? How should potential trans-national impacts be understood, managed, and governed?

Should bioengineers who design organisms for public release be expected to develop professional practices similar to other engineers whose work directly impacts public safety (e.g., structural engineers)? If established, how should such practices connect to other modes of public governance and oversight? 

What work, if any, should be prioritized to improve the safety and reliability of organisms bioengineered for broader release?

If and how should consumers, citizens, and others be informed about bioengineered organisms they may encounter?

Potential Outcomes

A summary and acknowledgement of the varying principles often appealed to and at stake in discussions involving the use and release of biotechnologies (e.g., the precautionary principle, the innovation principle, the principle of free markets and individual liberty, community sovereignty, principles of free prior consent, human rights, and dignity).

A statement advising how to construct governance of biotechnologies beyond conventional containment, including attention to the limitations of “self-governance” and the importance of expanding participation to foreground different forms of knowledge and expertise.

A call to develop and formalize an “ecological safety level” (ESL) approach for guiding and governing potential release or broader distribution of bioengineered organisms.

A prioritized foundational research agenda that could improve the safety or reliability of bioengineered organisms.

Guidance for how biotechnology practitioners can track and respond to concerns regarding biotechnology and for how bioengineered organisms should be labeled.

Framing Biotechnology’s Futures

What made Asilomar 1975 matter most was arguably not the concentrated gathering of scientific expertise. Rather, the re-framing of problems by legal experts and the re-presentation of possibilities by journalists made Asilomar a unique event in the history of biotechnology. Legal experts introduced seemingly unfamiliar constraints on academic freedom even as journalists redefined vocabulary like “genetic engineering.” How we conceptualize and talk about (i.e., frame) biotechnology underlies and shapes all that happens or is blocked.

Today terms like bio-terrorism, bio-economy, and bio-competition are entrenched or emerging as frames that are reaching public consciousness. In an age where our media landscape is larger, more fractured and dynamic, journalism like Michael Rogers’ epic 1975 Rolling Stone article – “The Pandora's Box Congress” – would now be only one of many communication channels driving major shifts in contemporary discussions and debate. 

Diverse frames already exist within the cultural narratives that guide our decisions and actions. For example, many economic philosophies share a short-term, growth-focused narrative. In contrast, the Indigenous principle of seven-generations stewardship promotes holistic, communal, and sustainable decision making for the benefit of the longer-term future. 

The “Spirit of Asilomar” invites us to account for what or who has been missing from discussions, to critique, and to say "here's another way to move forward." A fuller engagement with various stakeholders and communities invested in biotechnology’s futures, and the frames that matter to each, can help all better recognize proxy battles versus points of fundamental disagreement. Understanding – and helping others to understand – the differing perspectives offered by various frames can create opportunities to shape the future of biotechnology – and our societies – in new ways.

Initial Discussion Topics 

What is or should be the role of diverse publics and civil society in enabling, shaping, and constraining the future of biotechnology? Which frames most engage and give agency to various groups? 

Whose biotechnology is it? Are people consumers, workers, or citizens of the bioeconomy and how does that intersect with transitions in the broader economy? What makes one country’s bioeconomy different from another’s? 

What do concepts like ownership, equity, agency, optionality and sharing mean to each of us in the context of the future of biotechnology?

What new or other “framings” need to be broached for future biotechnology? What must, should, could, and won’t be true in such futures?

Potential Outcomes

A “better Asilomar” playbook for those seeking to navigate emerging technologies, biological or beyond. 

A compendium of framings that acknowledges and can be used to help others understand biotechnology from diverse perspectives. 

One or many statements summarizing what must, should, could, and will not be true about the future of biotechnology.

Other outcomes that matter to the diversity of perspectives, values, and worldviews present at this summit.